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 ABSTRACT 
A STUDY ON THE ONSET OF CIVIL CONFLICT 
By 
Chanil Jung 
The author broadly categorizes the models of civil war literatures on conflict onset into five 
dimensions: government, individual, geo-political, regional, and international. From 
empirically testing the models from each dimension, this study was able to find largely 
consistent results with major works on the topic. The following indicators were significant 
from the testing: on government dimension, the government’s capacity to repress and contain 
dissents; on individual dimension, the private incentives such as lootable primary commodities 
and opportunity costs proxied by education and income; on geo-political dimension, natural 
resource sites and the history of conflict; on regional dimension, regional spill-over effects 
through population movement and neighboring conflicts; finally, on international dimension, 
peacekeeping operations on the prevention of recurring civil war. This study used panel IV 
regression with an endogenous variable, GDP per capita instrumented with the access to 
electricity (% of household). Additionally, this study used dynamic panel models for the 
estimation of the effect of peacekeeping operations on the recurrence of civil war to supplement 
more commonly used survival analysis, which does not include temporal variations of 
independent variables. The findings suggest that there are specific conditions that favor the 
onset of civil war, and that civil wars are not necessarily accidental or idiosyncratic. Based on 
this findings, the author argues that the international efforts should be a two-tracked approach: 
one with immediate intervention to halt conflicts and regional spill-over; and the other with a 
more targeted approach to economic and social development.     
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“Politically speaking, it is insufficient to say that power and violence are not the same. Power 
and violence are opposites; where the one rules absolutely, the other is absent. Violence 
appears where power is in jeopardy, but left to its own course it ends in power’s disappearance.” 
-On Violence, Hannah Arendt 
 
“And we must take the current when it serves 
Or lose our ventures.” 
-Julius Caesar, William Shakespeare 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The burgeoning studies of civil war onset have claimed that various macro-economic, 
geographic, and political indicators can explain the mechanisms behind the outbreak of civil 
conflict. The purpose of this study is to survey literatures on civil war onset and empirically 
test their models on the basis of the five-dimension categorization. This study argues that the 
models and hypotheses from the existing literatures can be sorted into governmental, individual, 
geo-political, regional, and international dimensions depending on their emphasis as the 
following figure illustrates. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
These dimensions are based on specific mechanisms and theories on the determinants of civil 
war: on government dimension, the government’s capacity to repress; on individual dimension, 
Figure 1. Dimensions of Civil Conflict
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the theories on the individual incentives of participating in the rebel activities; on geo-political 
dimension, geographically inherent or politically inherited aspects; on regional dimension, 
direct and indirect spill-over of neighboring conflicts; and on international dimension, the 
effectiveness of international aid and peacekeeping operations in preventing civil war 
recurrence. These theories are not mutually exclusive or unilateral. Some indicators of civil 
war may be translated from one dimension to the other following a different logic. For instance, 
both rebels (at individual level) and the government can fund their hostile activities using 
natural resources in the geo-political dimension. Still, the logical focus is different across the 
dimensions.     
The empirical testing part of this research will use binary dependent variable panel data that 
has been constructed from a number of different datasets. The testing econometrics methods 
are panel ordinary least squares with random effects and instrumental variable and Arellano-
Bond/Blundell-Blover dynamic panel estimation. Since the dependent variable is binary (civil 
war onset), the non-linear maximum likelihood estimation is widely used among civil war 
literatures. However, this study is not particularly interested in the marginal effects of the 
independent variable and the statistical results and inferences are very similar between the two 
estimation techniques. Moreover, the most frequently raised concern on this type of studies is 
the problem of endogeneity, i.e., the control variable, GDP per capita is assumed to be highly 
endogenous and reversely correlated with the civil war. Although fixed-effect/random-effect 
framework can provide a solution to unobserved heterogeneity, these methods cannot rightly 
dress the question on the endogenous regressor within the model. This type of problem can be 
alleviated with using the right types of instrumental variables in panel OLS models. On the 
other hand, the dynamic panel estimation method provides additional insight to the testing of 
the indicator of major interest in the international dimension, peacekeeping operations, through 
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controlling for strong reverse causality of peacekeeping and civil war which could not be 
controlled using the former method. This was made possible through using lags of independent 
and dependent variables as instruments as the statistical model specifies. 
The previous studies often neglect endogeneity problems or use lags of independent variables 
or clustered periods (Collier & Hoeffler, 2002, 2008; Rost & Greig, 2011) but this treatment 
does not provide a good solution (Satyanath and Sergenti, 2004). In some other cases they use 
instrumental variables for consistent estimation of their models.1 This study also seeks to avert 
the criticism on the endogeneity of income variable by using “access to electricity (% of 
population)” as instrument.       
Studying the overall, and interacting effects of the above dimensions may shed a light on the 
policy implications related to “what can be done and how?” in preventing and discouraging 
intrastate conflict.   
                                                 
1 Ross (2006) uses ‘resource per capita’ and Braithwaite el al. (2014) use ‘international inequalities’ as their 
instruments. 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW  
Government dimension 
Peace is not merely an absence of violence. As Max Weber wrote in his seminal essay, Politics 
as a Vocation (1919), regardless of whether the state owns the legitimacy bestowed by the 
majority of its people, the state is the entity that possesses the “monopoly on violence” within 
its territorial bound. The state is needlessly just or democratic if it is to be stable. A fully 
autocratic regimes may be more stable than feeble democracies with weak state institutions 
(Hegre et al. 2001). From this point of view, a power balance between the government and the 
rebel is critical. No matter how saturated is the grievance or greed among the populace, a strong 
polity with repressive state apparatuses can prevent the coalescence of violent upheaval. A 
good example is North Korea. In spite of its frail economy and alleged human rights violations, 
there has not been many known accounts of mass civil strifes or violent clashes within its 
country that can amount to a civil war. The political elites has maintained their absolute grasp 
on the means of violence and terror in North Korea through military drills and terrorizing 
executions and persecutions of dissenters.  
Likewise, many existing literatures pay attention to the dynamics between the rebel’s capacity 
and the capacity of repressive state (Besley & Persson, 2008, 2009; Hegre et al, 2001; Smith, 
2004; Zack-Williams, 1999). A state’s capacity can be expressed as its expenditure spent on 
military, control of weapons, and the extent and the efficiency of population-monitoring 
intelligence state institutions. Basically, any kind of civil war mechanism requires the expected 
cost and benefit analysis of the population who are the most likely to join the rebel force. For 
the government-centric mechanism, a cost-increasing role of the government is important in 
suppressing any possible anti-government movements in light of the fact that civil wars are 
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predominantly clustered in countries that either generates a great amount of grievances or do 
not provide representative channels to the population. 
Unlike strong authoritarian states like North Korea or working institutionalized democratic 
states, transitional governments and repressive governments without a strong polity are likely 
to be exposed to the threats of civil war because they can neither sufficiently increase the costs 
of rebellion nor provide enough incentives to quell dissents and grievances. In such cases, a 
move to strengthen their authoritative state institutions or military could lead to a backfire, by 
drawing resources from other social sectors and adversely affecting economic growth (Collier 
& Hoeffler, 2002c) or as citizens are aggrieved and inflamed by the repressive the 
government’s repression (Davenport et al., 2005).  
In their paper which studied the regional spill-over effect of military expenditure, Collier & 
Hoeffler (2002c) found that a country’s military expenditure does increase in accordance with 
the increase in the military expenditure of its neighbors. However, they could not find a 
supporting empirical evidence that the increase in the spending actually leads to the diminished 
risk (deterrence) of internal civil conflict from the regression analysis. Since there is a 
reasonable concern on reverse causality where the general security environment which is more 
conducive of civil conflict affected the military expenditure, they used ‘external threats’ as 
instruments. Still, the regression results on the model which included military expenditure and 
its squared term were jointly insignificant, indicating “ineffectiveness” of the government’s 
attempt to raise military expenditure to attain domestic stability.2 This reflects the difficulties 
faced by weak institutions in their attempt to bolster their legitimacy through repression. The 
simple calculation by Besley & Persson 2009 using the Political Terror Scale dataset (Gibney 
                                                 
2 Collier and Hoeffler, 2002 
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et al.) backs up this idea. In their calculations, the repressive states have significantly lower 
average per capita income ($3,200) compared to peaceful countries ($6,500), but higher per 
capita income compared to civil war stricken countries ($2,000). This suggests that the 
repression is commonly chosen by weak institution, but they can only be successful when their 
capacity exceeds some threshold; a typical inverse U-shaped relationship.    
Although it’s a subject of discussion in the later part of this paper, the literatures on natural 
resources and its relationship with the conflict onset or duration postulate that oil and other 
primary resources oftentimes provide the governments means to invest in the regime’s security 
apparatuses and military (Ross, 2001; Smith, 2004; Fjelde, 2009). 
In general, the current works on civil war agree that weak institutions are more susceptible to 
conflicts and the logics of the government dimension revolves around the government’s 
capacity to repress. It appears that the propensity of civil war has less to do with the types of 
polity—whether it’s democratic or autocratic, but much more to do with its capacity.   
 
Individual dimension 
The theories of individual incentives provide the most commonly used theoretical framework 
in the studies of civil war. This approach pays attention to the expected return and the cost of 
participating insurrection at the individual level, i.e. lower the cost of participation and higher 
the expected return, an individual is more likely to participate in the rebel activity. While the 
theories of government focuses on the government’s capacity to crash down dissents, the 
theories of private incentives highlight the supply side of the equation on how rebels recruit 
and how individuals are attracted to the opportunities of insurrection. 
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Grossman (1991) is one of the earliest scholars who theorized this line of thought. According 
to his general equilibrium model, a peasant family has options to earn income from productive 
activity, soldiering, and insurrection. The amount of time devoted by a peasant to insurrection 
is determined by the ruler’s tax rate and the probability of successful insurrection. According 
to the model, when the tax rate and the winning chances of the insurrection are high, a peasant 
can expect higher returns from insurrection. 
On a similar vein, Collier and Hoeffler (2004) introduced ‘grievance’ and ‘greed’ models of 
civil war. The greed model uses the exploitation of primary resources as incentives to the rebel 
recruitment and treats per capita income as the opportunity cost; and the grievance model 
incorporates various factors of discontent among people, such as ethnic and religious 
fractionalization, income inequality, and the state repression.  
Following the greed logic, it appears economically sound to assume that the individuals with 
less opportunity cost can be more easily attracted to joining militant groups. This can provide 
plausible explanations to the well-known phenomenon of civil war being the most frequent 
among the lowest per capita income countries. However, controlling for the reverse or spurious 
correlation in empirical studies to test this claim is challenging due to the extent of which can 
be affected by the poverty. Therefore, proxy variables such as secondary education enrollment 
(Collier & Hoeffler, 2004; Deininger, 2003) and economic shocks (Besley & Persson, 2009; 
Chassang & Padro-i-Miquel, 2009; Collier et al., 2004; Dube & Vargas, 2008; Miguel & 
Satyanath, 2011; Miguel et al., 2004) are often used in lieu of, and in addition to GDP per 
capita variable. The rationales are: countries rich in human capital typically generate wealth in 
ways that cannot be easily exploited by simple violence and occupation; and external economic 
shocks are exogenous to income variation. These studies were able to find some robust links 
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between civil strifes and education attainment; and also external income shocks such as those 
caused by fluctuations of primary commodity prices. 
On the grievance model side, income inequality is frequently discussed as a source of grievance 
and civil strifes (Baten & Mumme, 2013; Collier & Hoeffler, 2004, 2002b; Fjelde, 2009; Houle, 
2014). Also, higher inequality implies lower recruitment cost (Collier & Hoeffler, 2002b). 
However, the results of its empirical testing on the outbreak of civil war are somewhat mixed, 
although it may be related to the duration of civil conflict.3  
Because of the incompleteness of the data on inequality, Baten and Mumme (2013) used an 
anthropometric indicator, an adult height data as a proxy for the measure of social and income 
inequality for the period of 1816 to 1999. To address possible endogeneity problems, they used 
the ratio of sugar cane and wheat plantations as instrument variable since sugar cane is the 
“inequality crop” that is preferred to the relatively well-off compared to wheat which is the 
“equality crop”. 4  The IV-Probit results from their analysis showed a strong, positive 
relationship between the social and income inequality (deprivation) with the onset of civil war. 
Similarly, to augment for the weaknesses of the known Gini index as an inequality measure, 
Houle (2014) used “capital share of the value added in the manufacturing sector” and top 1 
percent share of the total income measures in his empirical study.5 Using maximum likelihood 
estimation (logit and two-stage probit) he found that coups are more likely when inequality is 
severe, but civil wars are not. His theory suggests that the direct and indirect effects of 
inequality have an ambiguous overall effects on civil war, because inequality can strengthen 
                                                 
3 Collier and Hoeffler, 2002b 
4 Batten and Mumme, 2013 
5 Houle, 2014, p.17. 
10 
 
military, which in turn, positively affects coups but negatively affects insurrections 
counteracting to the redistributive struggles. 
Another way of looking at private incentive mechanism is rent-seeking. Oil, coffee, precious 
metals, and some primary commodities are relatively easy to exploit and cause greed-driven 
factional strifes. Some of them are termed as ‘conflict-minerals’ because of their known 
proclivity to cause civil war. However, the exploitation often takes place higher than an 
individual level and the presence of these resources are highly geography-dependent. Therefore, 
in this study, the subject of natural resource is included in the ‘geo-political dimension’ in the 
next part of this chapter. Also, although some scholars relate ethnic and religious 
fractionalization with grievance, it is hard to believe that ethnic and religious heterogeneity is 
in and of itself a direct cause of hatred (Collier, 2003). Therefore, they were not included in 
this dimension. 
 
Geopolitical dimension 
This dimension pertains to factors that either tend to be inherent in the geographic region and 
relatively time-invariant (land size, natural resource, ethnic and religious heterogeneity, 
mountainous regions, forest size, border proximity, and climate), or political factors that tend 
to be exogenously determined (given) from the previous conflicts or by political actors (conflict 
settlement, ‘veto players’ (Cunningham 2006), extremist violence, and the characteristics of 
the previous conflict). This type of approach may be less useful in prescribing policy 
suggestions, but can be useful in understanding why civil wars tend to cluster in geographic 
space (as it can be seen from Figure 2, the most conflict-prone regions are often closely located). 
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Figure 2. Civil Conflict Heat Map (1960-2010) 
 
 
Source: Armed Conflict Dataset (UCDP/PRIO), computed using WolframAlpha.
Ross (2004) presents a set of hypotheses on how natural resources affect civil war onset: 1) 
looted natural resources fund rebel’s initial startup; 2) & 3) resource extraction fuel grievances 
and separatism; 4) resource rents foster rentier state and weak institutions. From the thirteen 
cases he studied he could find that the natural resources indeed make civil wars more likely, 
last longer, and more intense. However, he could not find supporting evidence to the 
hypotheses 1 through 3. Regarding the hypothesis 4, Ross (2006) found a partial support that 
onshore oil revenue contribution to GDP per capita is tied to civil conflict.  
As natural resources can spur civil war, they can also help with the regime survival. Smith 
(2004) tested these contradicting claims on the effect of natural resources on the regime 
durability. He treated the regime failure as dependent variable and ran a logistic regression with 
the oil revenue as a share of GDP as one of the independent variable. The overall result was 
negative, meaning that the higher the share of oil revenue the less likely the regime will 
experience subversion. 
Among the items that frequently appear in the literatures on natural resources and civil war, 
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diamonds receive special attention. Lujala et al. (2005) and Ross (2006) used diamond deposit 
locations data to test their relationship with civil war and found that ‘secondary diamonds’ 
which are relatively low grade compared to ‘primary diamonds’ but are more lootable, are 
positively linked with the civil war onset. However, the number diamond producing countries 
and the number of civil wars took place in those countries are not big enough to draw strong 
implications. 
In empirical studies of civil war, ethnic and religious fractionalization is another famous topic 
of discussion. The baseline idea is that the fractionalization is the source of social grievance 
and dissension through the marginalization of minority groups (Collier & Hoeffler, 2004). 
Nonetheless, there seems not to be a reached consensus on its impact among scholars. While 
Fearon and Laitin (2003) rejected this school of thought, Collier and Hoeffler (1998, 2004), 
Buhaug (2010), Buhaug and Gleditsch (2008), and Celderman et al. (2009) were able to find 
moderate to strong linkages of ethnic/religious heterogeneity to civil conflicts. 
Other than those, geographical and sociological factors such as land size (Buhaug & Gates, 
2002), population (Fearon and Laitin, 2003), climate (Burke et al., 2009), and terrain 
(Cederman et al., 2009; Fjelde, 2009; Ross, 2006) are typically discussed in the empirical 
studies. The geographically larger nations and countries with big population are more likely to 
experience civil war probably due to the difficulty of controlling periphery regions with a 
limited state capacity. The principal-agent problems also tend to exacerbate as the organization 
becomes larger. The shares of mountainous and forest area within a country are thought to be 
positively related to insurrection because they provide covers and hideouts to the rebels shifting 
the tactical aspect to their advantage in conducting asymmetrical fights against the 
government’s regular military. Still, there is not much empirical evidence from the use of 
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macro data (Buhaug & Gates, 2002).    
On the political side, arguments on actors (Cunningham, 2006; Cunningham et al. 2005; Kydd 
and Walter, 2002) exist and concern mostly on the duration of civil war and the mechanisms 
on how the capacity of rebels and their extremism can shape the course of events. Settlement 
or agreement arguments (DeRouen et al. 2009; Glassmyer & Sambanis, 2008; Hartzell & 
Hoddie, 2003; Mattes & Savun, 2009) point out that specific types of agreements and their 
implementation after the termination of civil conflict matter deeply in the prevention of the 
recurrence of conflicts.  
Lastly, some studies make assertions that the history and characteristics of previous conflicts, 
such as outcomes are strongest determinants of civil war recurrence (Fortna 2004a; Kreutz, 
2010). They found that decisive victories won by the government’s side tend to create more 
lasting peace than stalemates or truce. Other studies find that the cost of conflict, such as battle 
deaths, affect the recurrence of civil war both directly and indirectly (Tiernay, 2014; Rost & 
Greig, 2011). There is also a study on the negative effect of colonial legacy on the onset of 
civil conflict (Craft & Smaldone, 2002).  
 
Regional dimension 
This dimension shares a common ground with the previous geopolitical dimension because of 
the inseparable nature of geographic regions with spatially shared geopolitical aspects. 
Nonetheless, I intend to separate this section from the last in order to highlight the concept of 
conflict spill-over, and bundle regional effects that are not accounted from the previous 
dimension. Also, compared to the geopolitical dimension of civil war determinants, the theories 
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I categorized under this section try to include extra-state geopolitical influences as opposed to 
within-state influences. 
There are a number of ways how a country can interact with its neighbors with regard to civil 
war onset. As mentioned above, regional spill-over of conflict is one possibility. Studies do 
find some evidences to this claim (Bosker & de Ree, 2014; Buhaug & Gates, 2002; Buhaug & 
Gleditsch, 2008; Sambanis, 2001), but the conflicts normally diffuse along the ethnic lines and 
does not affect neighboring countries as adversely when the countries do not share strong ethnic 
ties. 
Another channel of which neighboring states affect intrastate conflict is through aiding rebel 
activities through the support of arms and finance to weaken or subvert antagonistic states. 
Surprisingly, there has not been an extensive coverage on this topic. The existing literatures 
that I have found so far suggest the plausibility of this hypotheses using macro data. For 
example, Sambanis (2001) used median polity scores of neighboring states to assert that ‘bad 
neighborhood’ which are either undemocratic or at warring state, increases the probability of 
civil war onset. Similarly, Akcinaroglu and Radziszewski (2005) used the rivalry data and 
hazard ratio models to test the effect of expectations of rival intervention on civil war. 
According to their findings, the expectations tend to substantially lengthen the duration of 
fighting. Nevertheless, since politico-economic characteristics tend to be shared across states 
within a region whether their finding is robustly indicating such conclusions is in doubt. To 
better test these claims, we would need some in-depth qualitative case studies and more detailed 
data. 
Some literatures point to refugees and expatriates as a way to provide causal mechanisms to 
the neighborhood effect of civil conflict. The causal directions can go both ways: “refugees 
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can change the ethnic composition of the host state; exacerbate economic competition; bring 
with them arms, combatants, and ideologies that are conducive to violence”; and they could 
mobilize against their country of origin or join anti-government organization (Salehyan & 
Gleditsch 2006; Zack-Williams, 1999)6. Since refugees and displaced persons tend not to travel 
much far, this view reflects another regionally shared weakness in governance. Refugees from 
the country that is landlocked by working polities may find it extremely difficult to mobilize 
trans-national rebels because good chances are these types of organizations would be strictly 
forbidden and controlled. South Korea hosts tens of thousands North Korean refugees and these 
refugees often organize antagonistic campaign against North Korea. Still, these activities rarely 
go beyond leaflet dropping using balloons and stops far short from actually forming any type 
of militia-level organization. 
 
International dimension 
Other than what had been discussed above, the international community or international actors 
(regional community, NGOs, or sovereign states) can affect the likelihood of civil war through 
multiple avenues: international aid, deployment of peacekeepers, and trade policies. These are 
clearly extra-state in nature and have much room for policy implications unlike other within-
state variables.  
On the topic of international aid, the existing literatures are typically skeptical, if not only 
indirectly supportive of its conflict-deterring role. From empirical analysis, the literatures 
outlined in the below table 1 found either ‘no effect’ or ‘positive’ effect, i.e. conflict-prone. 
                                                 
6 Salehyan & Gleditsch, 2006. P. 338. 
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The signs in the parenthesis are the direction of possible indirect effects based on the author’s 
theories. The overall results are contrary to common expectations that aid would foster good 
governance and deter further conflicts. The explanatory mechanisms follow ‘greed’ or 
‘repression’ logics. The international aid can increase the expected rents once the rebels capture 
the state or strengthen the incumbent governments with funds to finance their military or 
financial means to appease the rebels (Arcand & Chauvet, 2001; Collier & Hoeffler, 2002b; 
Nunn & Qian, 2012; Grossman, 1992).  
Despite the lack of empirical evidence that aid is linked with longer peacetime, Collier and 
Hoeffler (2002b), suggests growth logic of the duration of peace. This mechanism suggests 
that aid is helpful in fostering good governance and growth, which in turn, has a potential to 
make civil wars less likely. Since economic development is the single-most prominent indicator 
of lasting peace, if the linkage between the aid and the economic growth is proven to be 
significantly positive, this theory can generate more support. Yet, due to the mechanisms 
presented above, the outcome can be reversed, even if such effects do exist.  
Table 1. Theories on International Aid and Civil War 
Author(Year) Note Effect on CW 
    Onset Duration   
Arcand & Chauvet (2001) Aid strengthens the incumbent, stabilizes the regime. 
No effect 
(-) NA 
Collier & Hoeffler (2002b) 
Aid does not directly affect the civil war 
onset, but may indirectly contribute to peace 
through growth effect;  
Increased aid may shorten conflict. 
Indirect 
effect  
(-) 
- 
De Ree & Nillesen (2009) 
Increasing aid may shorten conflict. No 
relationship is found between aid and the 
onset of civil war. 
No effect _ 
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Nielsen et al. (2011) Negative aid shocks increase the probability of conflict onset. 
No effect 
(+) NA 
Nunn & Qian (2012) US food aid increases the incidence, onset, and duration of civil conflicts. + + 
       
In sum, the dubious and elusive nature of the relationship between the international aid and the 
civil war requires further studies to differentiate any positive or negative effects, although the 
relationship itself may be “a priori ambiguous”, to quote Collier and Hoeffler (2002b).7  
On the other hand, in crisis situations, peacekeeping operations are often called for. Regarding 
its effect on bringing more lasting peace, scholars show stronger support than international aid. 
The claims are the following: the effect of the traditional and multidimensional peacekeeping 
operations is highly significant and consistent (Fortna, 2003, 2004a, 2004b); the expenditures 
spent on the UN peacekeeping missions substantially reduce the risk of civil conflict recurrence 
(Collier et al., 2008); the UN peacekeeping missions induce democratization and multilateral 
enforcement operations help with ending violence (Doyle and Sambanis (2000). 
Questions may be asked on the sample selection biases that peacekeeping operations may be 
deployed following specific patterns. Indeed, Rost and Greig (2011) found a statistical 
propensity of state-sent peacekeepers to be deployed to countries that share some linkages such 
as being a former colony or a trade partner. In addition, Gilligan and Stedman (2003) showed 
that the United Nations tend to spend more money on the missions in Africa, Latin America, 
Caribbean, and the Middle East. However, despite these tendencies, the UN peacekeeping 
missions did not choose relatively ‘easy’ missions as they select missions with humanitarian 
                                                 
7 Collier and Hoeffler, 2002b. P. 3.  
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crisis or great casualties (Fortna, 2004b; Gilligan & Stedman, 2003; Hultman, 2013).  
 
IV. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE THEORIES OF CIVIL WAR ONSET 
Research Data 
The dependent variable of this study is intrastate conflict episode. The internecine conflicts can 
be fought between the government and military faction(s) or among different factions. The 
events were recorded as episodes when they resulted in 25 or more annual battle-related deaths 
between the periods of 1990 to 2010 using Armed Conflict Dataset and Conflict Termination 
Dataset (CTD) constructed by Uppsala Conflict Data Program and Peace Research Institute 
Oslo (UCDP/PRIO). These datasets differentiate multiple conflicts fought at the same location 
if they involve different actors. This approach may be useful to track the recurrence of conflict 
between the same actors (namely, dyadic interactions), but may not be appropriate to look at 
country-centered conflicts because the same country can be counted multiple times depending 
on the number of dyadic relationships existing in the country. In that case, the most of same 
independent variables are included in the dataset multiple times, potentially biasing the results. 
For example, CTD records eight separate conflict episodes that are fought between the Indian 
government and various anti-government groups in which periods include the year 1997. 
Instead of treating these episodes as individual dyadic events, the dataset used in this study 
coded the year 1997 in India as ‘1’ (intrastate conflict is taking place).     
Similarly, multiple dyads were clustered based on the location of the conflict because the 
number of dyads may have implications on the scope and the intensity of conflict-prone 
situation at certain years, the initial conflict-begetting conditions may not be significantly 
different across civil wars. This research is primarily interested in the situation that favors or 
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begets internal conflicts amidst specific political and macroeconomic backdrops within 
national boundaries. 
Basing on the newly coded conflict dataset and World Bank’s country IDs, multitude of 
political/economic indicators spanning the period of 1990 to 2010 were collected using 
publicly available datasets to develop a comprehensive dataset that can provide multiple angles 
toward the subject. The list of data sources is in the following table. 
Table 2. Data Sources 
Data source Acronym Indicators used 
World Development Indicator WDI Socio-economic and political indicators. 
Penn World Table, version 8.0 PWT 8.0 GDP per capita. 
Conflict Termination Dataset CTD Conflict episodes. 
Bethany Lacina & Nils Petter Gleditsch, 
2005 
Lacina & 
Gleditsch Battle deaths.  
Organization for Economic Co-operation 
and Development OECD 
International aid. Total, commitment, and 
disbursement. 
United Nations UN Peacekeeping operations. 
The UN Refugee Agency UNHCR Number of refugee population. 
Stockholm International Peace Research 
Institute SIPRI Arms transfer, military expenditure. 
The Standardized World Income Inequality 
Database SWIID Gini index.  
Fractionalization Data (Alesina et al. 2003) Alesina et al. Ethnic, language, religious fractionalization
Small Arms Survey  SAS Number of small arms among civilian. 
Center for Systemic Peace CSP Refugee and polity data. 
Freedom House FH Political rights, civil liberty. 
Uppsala Conflict Data Program and Peace 
Research Institute Oslo UCDP/PRIO 
Conflict termination, armed conflict 
episodes from 1960-1990. 
World Governance Indicator WGI Quality of governance. 
Barro-Lee Educational Attainment Dataset Barro-Lee Primary education attainment, percentage of no schooling. 
Maddison Project Database MPD GDP per capita.  
The Conference Board CB Labor composition and quantity. 
United Nations Commodity Trade Database UN Comtrade Raw materials trade statistics. 
U.S. Energy Information Administration EIA Historical crude oil prices. 
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Ziltener&Künzler, 2013 Ziltener&Künzler Countries with past colonial experiences. 
Providing for Peacekeeping PFP Peacekeeping operations. 
Fraser Institute FI Economic freedom 
Political Terror Scale 1976-2013 PTS Scale measures of physical integrity rights violations worldwide 
 
 
Models and Hypotheses Testing 
The most commonly preferred econometrics techniques in the literatures of civil conflict are 
maximum likelihood estimation (logit or probit) and survival analysis model (Cox or Weibull 
hazard ratio models). Survival analysis models are useful in showing relative risk changes over 
time in the entire sample. For example, it can show the relative probability of getting a job 
depending on the duration of unemployment using a sample of unemployed people. This 
method has become famous among the scholars studying civil war and is also widely used. The 
method uses duration and event as a dependent variable. The duration is typically coded as the 
time (period) before an event takes place. In the studies of civil war, it is the years of peace 
before the conflict onset or recurrence. The caveat is that the standard application of this 
method does not capture the temporal variations of independent variables unlike the panel or 
time-series-cross-section (TSCS) data. The number of observations tend to be substantially 
dropped if the panel or TSCS data are rendered to run this type of estimation. Smaller number 
of observation is not always inimical to more correct or robust analysis, but requires deeper 
knowledge in the sampled cases.  
The standard likelihood estimation takes on the following form in case of binary dependent 
variable. 
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(1) 
Where Cit=1 is a presence of civil conflict at country i in year t, X is a vector of regressors and 
β is a vector of unknown population parameters. In the case of logit model, the F(ᆞ) function 
is specified as the cumulative distribution function of the logistic distribution.  
On the other hand, the linear probability model has the following form: 
 (2) 
In this case, the probability of civil war onset is not confined in 0 to 1 bounds giving it a 
disadvantage in measuring the marginal effects of coefficient when they are greater than l or 
less than -1. Other than this interpretational drawback, the sign and significance of estimated 
coefficient, 𝛽መை௅ௌ are generally agree with 𝛽መெ௅ா. 
Under the standard OLS framework, the model of civil war onset can be expressed as the 
following: 
 (3) 
Here, the lag of GDP per capita is an endogenous variable and X is a vector of controls and the 
regressors of interest. The term, α௜ is an unobserved, time-invariant heterogeneity and ϵ௜௧ is 
an error term. In this model, the sources of heteroskedasticity are the endogenous GDP per 
capita and α௜. α௜ can be treated with fixed-effects/random-effects estimation depending on 
whether this idiosyncratic noise is systemically correlated with the exogenous regressors. The 
choice of transformation can be determined using Hausman test. 
The advantage of IV panel OLS regression over binary logit/probit model is that it provides a 
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consistent estimation of the endogenous variable, gdpc. In the presence of endogeneity, the 
covariance between endogenous regressor and the error term is no longer zero 
(Covሺgdpc ∙ 𝜇௜௧ሻ ് 0, when 𝜇௜௧ ൌ 𝛼௜ ൅ 𝜖௜௧). This makes the estimate of λ and β biased and 
inconsistent. This is one of the biggest problems that the studies of civil war onset commonly 
face. The variable, GDP per capita is widely agreed to be a very important control to be 
included in the model, but is also highly endogenous. With the use of right IVs, the estimates 
of coefficients can become consistent, though still biased.   
The IV used in this study is “access to electricity (% of population)” index from WDI. A good 
IV requires be strongly correlated with the endogenous variable while not directly correlated 
with the error term. This “access to electricity” index is strongly correlated with the log of GDP 
per capita in the dataset and there are some works that identify the causal relationship between 
the electricity provision and the income (Wolde-Rufael, 2006; Mozumder & Marathe, 2007; 
Kanagawa & Nakata, 2008). I have not encountered any theoretical/empirical work on civil 
war that specify the relationship between the electricity provision and the onset of civil war, 
and there hardly is a good theoretical linkage between the two. This makes this variable a good 
candidate for an IV. 
Since this study deals with a multitude of models from each dimension, more concerns on 
endogeneity of some independent variables from this study may be raised. However, while the 
possible endogeneity of those regressors requires some investigation, the endogeneity of GDP 
capita is obvious and needs to be addressed. In the following empirical section, the log and 1 
year lag (to remove additional temporal endogeneity) of GDP per capita are included in most 
of the models and its IV treated coefficients and standard deviations are reported. 
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Government Dimension 
For the government dimension, based on the models discussed in the literature review, I 
included independent variables that can measure the government’s capacity and repression. 
The baseline controls were largely taken from Collier and Hoeffler (2004): log of GDP per 
capita, log of population, primary commodity dependence (proxied by the percentage of 
agricultural value added in GDP and the percentage of crude oil exports in the total export), 
previous war, and social fractionalization. Although Collier and Hoeffler included ‘male 
secondary schooling’ in their control variables, as they had mentioned in their paper, the 
secondary schooling is likely to be highly correlated with GDP per capita.8 Also, it is 
widely agreed that the three controls—GDP per capita, population size, and the previous 
war should be included in empirical models.9 Therefore, the log of GDP per capita was 
used in lieu of secondary schooling from the Collier and Hoeffler model. 
The other independent variables of interest are: military expenditure to GDP ratio, military 
expenditure to GDP ratio squared, armed forces personnel as a percentage of total labor 
force and its squared, polity measures (whether a country is institutionalized democracy or 
autocracy), arms imported, number of small arms among population, and freedom status 
(‘-1’ for ‘Not Free’, ‘0’ for ‘Partially Free’, and ‘1’ for ‘Free’)10. 
Each of these regressors was included in the models at different trials to segregate their 
similar effects and to avoid multicollinearity problems except for the squared terms. The 
                                                 
8 Collier and Hoeffler, 2004. Page 15. 
9 Hegre and Sambanis, 2006. P. 513. 
10 Re-coded from the Freedom House dataset. 
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IV panel regression results are in Table 3. 
The result demonstrates a good support to the repression model—a repressive government 
with sufficient capacity is less likely to see rebellion. Especially, while the sign of military 
expenditure to GDP ratio is positive, the sign of its squared term is negative in all the model 
outcomes suggesting an inverse U-curve relationship. In other words, moderately 
repressive governments may fall short of fully deterring insurrection and merely incite 
unauthorized violence following Collier and Hoeffler’s ‘grievance’ logic of civil war.  
 
VARIABLES (1) Onset 
(2) 
Onset 
(3) 
Onset 
(4) 
Onset 
(5) 
Onset 
(6) 
Onset 
(7) 
Onset 
(8) 
Onset 
(9) 
Onset 
Log of GDP per capita. 1 year-
lagged. (PWT) 
-0.0333 
(0.0494) 
-0.128* 
(0.0657) 
-0.108* 
(0.0655)
-0.106 
(0.0651)
-0.114* 
(0.0637) 
-0.222**
(0.0949)
-0.121* 
(0.0669) 
-0.140* 
(0.0764) 
-0.118* 
(0.0617) 
Log of population. (WDI) 0.0506*** (0.0150) 
0.0461*** 
(0.0162) 
0.0627***
(0.0198)
0.0631***
(0.0198)
0.0609***
(0.0191) 
0.0508**
(0.0212)
0.0444*** 
(0.0166) 
0.0480*** 
(0.0171) 
0.0533**
(0.0241) 
Countries with civil war 
experience before 1990. (CTD) 
0.0819 
(0.0569) 
0.0686 
(0.0696) 
0.0701 
(0.0732)
0.0733 
(0.0731)
0.0786 
(0.0702) 
0.0675 
(0.0878)
0.0642 
(0.0711) 
0.0638 
(0.0722) 
0.0720 
(0.0692) 
Military expenditure to GDP 
ratio. 1yr-lag. (SIPRI) - 
0.0158 
(0.00992) 
0.0165 
(0.0102)
0.0166 
(0.0102)
0.0186* 
(0.0100) 
0.00752
(0.0129)
0.0155 
(0.0101) 
0.0150 
(0.0103) 
0.0167* 
(0.00980)
Military expenditure to GDP 
ratio squared. 1yr-lag. (SIPRI) - 
-0.000658** 
(0.000271) 
-0.000684**
(0.000277)
-0.000705**
(0.000277)
-0.000764***
(0.000275)
-0.000791*
(0.000428)
-0.000610** 
(0.000275) 
-0.000642**
(0.000278) 
-0.000677**
(0.000269)
Ethnic fractionalization. (Alesina 
et al.) 
0.000442 
(0.112) 
-0.0154 
(0.130) 
0.0271 
(0.137) 
0.0341 
(0.137) 
0.0549 
(0.133) 
0.0839 
(0.157)
-0.0376 
(0.132) 
-0.0146 
(0.131) 
-0.0176 
(0.131) 
Agriculture, value added (% of 
GDP) (WDI) 
0.00186 
(0.00373) 
-0.00826* 
(0.00490) 
-0.00669
(0.00488)
-0.00641
(0.00486)
-0.00669 
(0.00475)
-0.0180**
(0.00806)
-0.00773 
(0.00501) 
-0.00890* 
(0.00537) 
-0.00765*
(0.00463)
Crude petroleum export (% of 
total export) (comtrade) 
0.151** 
(0.0682) 
0.140* 
(0.0776) 
0.143* 
(0.0816)
0.154* 
(0.0815)
0.183** 
(0.0832) 
0.0329 
(0.0999)
0.110 
(0.0796) 
0.140* 
(0.0781) 
0.142* 
(0.0779) 
Armed forces personnel (% of 
total labor force) 1yr lag. (WDI) 
0.00753 
(0.0169) - - - - - - - - 
Armed forces personnel (% of 
total labor force) squared. 1yr 
lag. (WDI) 
-0.00142 
(0.00188) - - - - - - - - 
Institutionalized Democracy  
(CSP) - - 
-0.00152**
(0.000699) - - - - - - 
Institutionalized Autocracy  
(CSP) - - - 
-0.00207***
(0.000708) - - - - - 
Table 3. Panel IV Regression Results, Random Effects (Government Dimension) 
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Revised Combined Polity (CSP) - - - - 0.00669**(0.00295) - - - - 
2-year lag of logged TIV of arms 
imported. (SIPRI) - - - - - 
0.0111*
(0.00589) - - - 
Freedom status. (FH) - - - - - - -0.0403** (0.0196) - - 
Log of number of small arms per 
100 people. 1yr-lag. (SAS) - - - - - - - 
0.0110 
(0.0284) - 
Log of the number of small arms 
among civilians. 1yr-lag. (SAS) - - - - - - - - 
-0.00962
(0.0235) 
Constant -0.479 (0.547) 
0.535 
(0.715) 
0.0449 
(0.683) 
0.00209
(0.679) 
0.0646 
(0.667) 
1.372 
(1.021)
0.518 
(0.723) 0.599(0.760) 0.447(0.677)
Observations 1,367 935 896 896 887 704 926 935 935 
Number of cn 133 100 94 94 93 83 100 100 100 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
 
On the contrary, if the governments’ investment in its repressive apparatus reaches above 
certain level, like North Korea, the cost of insurrection may become prohibitively high. A 
similar relationship was found with the arms imported while the number of armed forces 
personnel among total labor force did not show any statistical significance (Model (2) and 
(6)).  
As predicted, the sign of the coefficient of the variable, ‘freedom status’ is negative, adding 
weight to the grievance logic. The coefficient is also significant at the 0.1 level. 
‘Institutionalized Autocracy’ and ‘Institutionalized Democracy’ are significant at the 0.5 
level with a negative sign. This may look counterintuitive, but is consistent with the 
findings from Hegre et al. (2001), that “semi democracies (regimes intermediate between 
a democracy and an autocracy) exhibit a higher propensity for civil conflict than either 
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extreme”.11  
The number of small arms among people was expected to display some significant 
relationship because it erodes the government’s monopoly right over violence. However, 
contrary to the expectation, it did not turn out to be statistically significant. Still, the data 
on arms among civilians is incomplete and subject to strong sample selection bias. 
Therefore, one should take this result with care. 
 
Individual Dimension 
The independent variables in this category were chosen to see the effect of individual incentives 
in the breakout of intrastate conflicts. Broadly, they concern with education, primary 
commodity dependence, labor compensation, inequality, and health. For education, primary 
education enrollment (gross) and percentage of no-schooling among adults aged 20-24 were 
selected; for primary commodity dependence, crude petroleum export and agriculture value 
added as a percentage of GDP were used; and for labor compensation, inequality, and health, 
labor participation rate, Gini coefficient, and lagged life expectancy indicators were used, 
respectively. The baseline control variables are, in general, similar to Fearon and Laitin (2003) 
except for ‘mountainous terrain’ variable, which was substituted with the percentage of forest 
area within country. 
 
 
                                                 
11 Hegre et al. 2001. p 33. 
27 
 
   
VARIABLES (1) Onset 
(2) 
Onset 
(3) 
Onset 
(4) 
Onset 
(5) 
Onset 
(6) 
Onset 
Log of GDP per capita. 1 year-
lagged. (PWT) 
-0.0224 
(0.0312) 
0.0425 
(0.0373) 
-0.0656*** 
(0.0201) 
0.0541 
(0.0456) 
-0.0263 
(0.0313) 
-0.0465* 
(0.0240) 
Log of population. (WDI) 0.0391*** (0.0150) 
0.0433*** 
(0.0163) 
0.0362*** 
(0.0122) 
0.0368*** 
(0.0107) 
0.0354*** 
(0.0109) 
0.0395*** 
(0.0130) 
Countries with civil war experience 
before 1990. (CTD) 
0.143** 
(0.0590) 
0.179*** 
(0.0625) 
0.123*** 
(0.0472) 
0.151*** 
(0.0487) 
0.102** 
(0.0479) 
0.137*** 
(0.0501) 
Primary education (gross). (WDI) -0.00308***(0.000947) - - - - - 
Ethnic fractionalization. (Alesina et 
al.) 
0.0168 
(0.121) 
-0.0118 
(0.120) 
-0.00928 
(0.0913) 
-0.0685 
(0.0846) 
-0.0113 
(0.0904) 
-0.0201 
(0.105) 
Crude petroleum export (% of total 
export) (comtrade) 
0.0907 
(0.0743) 
0.116 
(0.0768) - - - - 
Percentage of No Schooling, age 20-
24 (Barro-Lee) - 
0.00605***
(0.00175) - - - - 
Forest area (% of land area) (WDI) - - 0.000290 (0.000830) 
1.71e-05 
(0.000802) 
0.000520 
(0.000806) - 
Labor force participation rate, male 
(% of male population ages 15-64) 
(modeled ILO estimate) (WDI) 
- - -0.00323* (0.00185) - - - 
Life expectancy at birth, male (years). 
1yr lag. (WDI) - - - 
-0.0162*** 
(0.00436) - - 
Agriculture, value added (% of GDP) 
(WDI) - - - - 
0.00417*** 
(0.00158) - 
Gini coefficient. (SWIID) - - - - - 0.000380 (0.00146) 
Constant -0.0569 (0.370) 
-1.070** 
(0.442) 
0.327 
(0.305) 
0.123 
(0.219) 
-0.313 
(0.323) 
-0.155 
(0.298) 
Observations 1,343 1,417 3,237 3,318 3,072 2,539 
Number of cn 134 123 166 174 167 154 
Standard errors in parentheses       
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1             
 
Table 4 is the result of the logistic regression on these topics. The results appear to be consistent 
with the theories of private incentives found in the literatures.  
Table 4. Panel IV Regression Results, Random Effects (Individual Dimension) 
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The coefficients of the primary education enrollment and the percentage of no schooling 
among 20-24 years old are both significant and partially suggest that the less the 
opportunity cost (approximated by the education attainment level) the more likely the 
individual actors are likely to participate in the rebel activity as it was suggested by Collier 
and Hoeffler’s greed logic. A simple collinearity check was performed to test possible 
multicollinearity issue between GDP per capita, education and labor. The result showed a 
moderate degree of variance inflation factor (VIF), indicating a minor multicollinearity 
(Table 5). 
Table 5. Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) Analysis, model (1-6) 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Log of population. (WDI) 1.14 1.2 1.16 1.22 1.26 1.15 
Log of GDP per capita. 
(PWT) 1.45 1.59 1.44 3.67 3.72 1.65 
Countries with civil war 
experience before 1990. 
(CTD) 
1.26 1.25 1.29 1.32 1.34 1.36 
Primary education (gross). 
(WDI) 1.05      
Ethnic fractionalization. 
(Alesina et al.) 1.34 1.31 1.32 1.46 1.41 1.44 
Crude petroleum export (% 
of total export) (comtrade) 1.1 1.11     
Percentage of No Schooling, 
age 20-24 (Barro-Lee)  1.32     
Forest area (% of land area) 
(WDI)   1.03 1.04 3.17  
Labor force participation 
rate, male (% of male 
population ages 15-64) 
(modeled ILO estimate) 
(WDI) 
  1.01    
Life expectancy at birth, 
male (years). 1yr lag. (WDI)    3.8   
Agriculture, value added (% 
of GDP) (WDI)     1.07  
Gini coefficient. (SWIID)           1.4 
Mean VIF 1.22 1.3 1.21 2.09 1.99 1.4 
Calculated using STATA collin command. 
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The coefficients of labor compensation, health (4), and primary commodity dependence (5) 
seem to behave in ways predicted from the theory: smaller labor compensation and worse 
health are related with lowering the opportunity cost. The primary commodities are linked 
with ‘rent-seeking’ logic because they are relatively more appropriable and lootable using 
violence compared to secondary and tertiary commodities. The coefficients are all 
statistically significant as well.  
On the topic on inequality, no statistical evidence was found from the empirical testing 
(model (6)). This may be in part due to the availability and measurement error issues in the 
publicly available data. The lack of strongly plausible and convincible theories that connect 
inequality with civil wars may be another problem. More studies in theory and empirical 
research is required on this issue.      
 
Geo-political Dimension 
As mentioned above, the tested variables in this section are the indicators that are inherently 
geo-political in nature. For example, ethnic and religious fractionalization in a state do not 
change significantly over time. Its terrain, history, population make-up, and etc. are broadly 
inherited rather than contemporaneously changing.  
Those variables are: ethnic, religious, and language heterogeneities, natural resource (primary 
commodity, oil, and diamond), terrain (land area and the forest area as a percentage of surface 
area), a country’s colonial history, previous history of civil conflict (binary and the counts of 
battle-related deaths from 1960 to 1989), population density, and agricultural productivity 
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(measured by cereal yield per hectare). The basic controls are identical to previous empirical 
tests as the models of geo-political dimension came from a wide array of literatures. 
Table 6 lists the models from which the empirical testing from this section drew its rationales. 
The results from those models do not always point to the same direction due to the differences 
in scopes and analytic methods of those literatures. Nevertheless, some of those topics receive 
continuous attention throughout the empirical studies in the field.  
Table 6. Geo-political Variables and Empirical Models 
Topic Empirical Model 
Social fractionalization Buhaug, 2010; Buhaug and Gleditsch, 2008; Braithwaite et al., 2014; Cederman et al., 2009; Collier & Hoeffler, 1998, 2004; Fjelde, 2009 
Crude oil Besley and Persson, 2008; De Ree and Nillesen, 2009; Dube & Vargas, 2008; Fjelde, 2009; Ross, 2001, 2004, 2006; Smith, 2004 
Land size Buhaug & Gates, 2002 
Terrain Cederman et al., 2009; Fjelde, 2009; Ross, 2006 
Battle deaths Rost & Greig, 2011; Tiernay, 2014 
Colonial experience Craft & Smaldone, 2002 
Diamond Lujala et al. 2005; Ross, 2006 
 
Although not much is talked about the effect of population density, it is included in the 
model to see the possible relations between the two most cited geo-political variables; 
population size and the size of land area. The fertility of the land may be highly correlated 
with the GDP per capita because the agricultural technology is a strong indicator of crop 
production within a given space of land. Still, it is also highly affected by climate 
(temperature and precipitation) and was expected to provide deeper insight on the possible 
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relationship between the geographic characteristics of the land and the conflict onset. For 
instance, people living on a barren field may be more likely to feel the incentives of joining 
militia if the organization offers means to survive and opportunities to plunder.   
Based on these rationales, logistic regression was used to test the models in this dimension. 
The panel IV regression results are in Table 7. 
 
VARIABLES (2) Onset 
(1) 
Onset 
(3) 
Onset 
(4) 
Onset 
(5) 
Onset 
(6) 
Onset 
(7) 
Onset 
(8) 
Onset 
(9) 
Onset 
Log of GDP per capita. 1 
year-lagged. (PWT) 
-0.0370 
(0.0323) 
-0.0474** 
(0.0203) 
-0.0746***
(0.0188)
-0.0663***
(0.0190)
-0.1000***
(0.0330)
-0.0569***
(0.0217)
-0.0635*** 
(0.0199) 
-0.0568*** 
(0.0183) 
-0.0668***
(0.0191)
Log of population. (WDI) 0.0420*** (0.0125) 
0.0286*** 
(0.0108) 
0.0130 
(0.0118)
0.0328***
(0.0109)
0.0423*
(0.0251)
0.0287***
(0.0110)
0.0302*** 
(0.0108) - 
0.0310***
(0.0106)
Countries with civil war 
experience before 1990. 
(CTD) 
0.0822* 
(0.0493) 
0.113** 
(0.0462) 
0.119***
(0.0457)
0.104**
(0.0465) - 
0.106**
(0.0461)
0.103** 
(0.0466) 
0.133*** 
(0.0445) 
0.107**
(0.0463)
Ethnic fractionalization. 
(Alesina et al.) 
0.0283 
(0.0952) 
-0.0905 
(0.106) 
0.0301 
(0.0865)
0.0204 
(0.0883)
-0.00888
(0.161) 
0.00626
(0.0881)
0.00959 
(0.0881) 
0.00472 
(0.0897) 
0.0189 
(0.0875)
Forest area (% of land 
area) (WDI) 
0.00102 
(0.000901) 
0.000649 
(0.000788) 
0.000570
(0.000782)
0.000836
(0.000808)
0.00206
(0.00152)
0.000772
(0.000794)
0.000694 
(0.000799) 
0.000392 
(0.000789) 
0.000813
(0.000805)
Religion fractionalization. 
(Alesina et al.) 
-0.247*** 
(0.0935) 
-0.277*** 
(0.0870) 
-0.237***
(0.0838)
-0.210**
(0.0861)
-0.376**
(0.148) 
-0.217**
(0.0849)
-0.220** 
(0.0853) 
-0.204** 
(0.0871) 
-0.224***
(0.0860)
Agriculture, value added 
(% of GDP) (WDI) 
0.00395** 
(0.00161) - - - - - - - - 
Cereal yield (kg per 
hectare) (WDI) 
-6.21e-07 
(2.09e-06) - - - - - - - - 
Language 
fractionalization. (Alesina 
et al.) 
- 0.223** (0.100) - - - - - - - 
Numbers of petroleum 
producing sites. (PRIO) - - 
0.00602***
(0.00177) - - - - - - 
Numbers of diamond sites. 
(PRIO) - - - 
-0.000582
(0.000805) - - - - - 
Log of cumulative battle 
deaths. Pre-1990. (L&G) - - - - 
1.71e-
06*** 
(6.21e-07)
- - - - 
Colonial experience 
(binary, 1=past colony). 
(Z&K) 
- - - - - 0.0424 (0.0499) - - - 
Table 7. Panel IV Regression Results, Random Effects (Geo-political Dimension) 
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Years of colonial 
experience. (Z&K) - - - - - - 
0.000109 
(0.000215) - - 
Log of land area. (WDI) - - - - - - - 0.0190** (0.00909) - 
Population density (people 
per sq. km of land area) 
(WDI) 
- - - - - - - - 2.46e-05(3.57e-05)
Constant -0.243 (0.346) 
0.103 
(0.235) 
0.563** 
(0.235) 
0.208 
(0.225) 
0.425 
(0.437) 
0.182 
(0.230) 
0.230 
(0.222) 
0.423** 
(0.214) 
0.240 
(0.221) 
Observations 2,907 3,230 3,390 3,390 1,706 3,390 3,390 3,393 3,390 
Number of cn 157 165 173 173 89 173 173 173 173 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
The results are, in general, conforms to the findings from the previous literatures. The history 
of civil violence is strongly related with the civil wars in later years and so does the log of 
cumulative battle related deaths (model (1), (3-4), (6-9) for the past civil war, model (5) for 
cumulative battle deaths). The number of petroleum producing sites is also found significant 
at .05 level. In model (8), the population size was replaced with the log of land size; they are 
all significant in other models as generally agreed among scholarly works. On social 
fractionalization, only religious fractionalization appears to be significant and the signs are all 
negative throughout the models (1-9). The smaller fractionalization in the religious status 
within a country reflects the less tolerant atmosphere of the society (Collier, 2003). There exists 
a number of religiously motivated civil wars (Toft, 2007), and the negative sign of the 
coefficient of religious fractionalization does neither directly support nor disapprove their 
existence. At least, the heterogeneity of a society appears to be a positive sign for peace. When 
this study used a logit random effect model for comparison, the cereal yield (kilograms per 
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hectare) was significant without controlling for the endogeneity of GDP per capita, but was 
insignificant when used with IV panel model.  
No statistically significant results were reported for colonial experience, population density, 
forest area, and diamonds.    
 
Regional Dimension 
In this dimension, the variables concerning the regional spill-over effects and region-specific 
elements were tested. The variables of key interest are: regional dummies, the inflow of 
refugees into the country, and neighborhood conflicts. The controlling variables are log of 
population, log of GDP per capita, ethnic fractionalization, and civil war experience and were 
identically applied to the models (1-10). 
As previously discussed, literatures often argue that conflicts can spill-over across borders 
(Buhaug & Gates, 2002; Murdoch & Sandler, 2002; Sambanis, 2001; Ward and Gleditsch, 
2002). For the assessment of this mechanism, CSP’s magnitude score of Major Event of 
Political Violence and total number of episodes at given year were used for bordering, 
neighboring, and regional states instead of simple binary estimate that marks the existence of 
violence at the year (‘neighborhood conflict dummy’ from Buhaug & Gleditsch, 2008) to add 
precision to the regression models. Additionally, the number of borders shared by the 
neighboring states was added into the model (model (4)) to see whether the effect is related to 
the increased exposure to such risks. 
On testing the subject of conflict diffusion/contagion through population movement suggested 
by Salehyan and Gleditsch (2006), an incoming refugee population variable was used. Luckily, 
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similar data from a number of sources (UNHCR, WDI, and CSP) exist. Therefore, a simple 
crosscheck of data validity could be done (models (1-3)). This variable was lagged a year to 
check for temporal causality that may exist between the influx of extra-state actors and the 
onset of civil war in the hosting country.  
Using SIPRI’s Trend Indicator Values of arms import data and 22 sub-region codes, I 
calculated the regional arms import at year t-1 by simply summing up the arms import at the 
sub-regional level. This variable was used in the model (9) to test the effect of regional buildup 
of arms on intrastate conflict. 
Lastly, in model (10), regional dummies were tested to see whether intrastate conflicts favor 
specific regions over others after controlling for the baseline indicators of civil conflict. The 
regression results are in Table 8.  
 
 
 
VARIABLES (1) Onset 
(2) 
Onset 
(3) 
Onset
(4) 
Onset 
(5) 
Onset
(6) 
Onset 
(7) 
Onset
(8) 
Onset 
(9) 
Onset 
(10) 
Onset 
Log of GDP per capita. 1 
year-lagged. (PWT) 
-0.0556*** 
(0.0214) 
-
0.0565***
(0.0214) 
-0.0715**
(0.0285)
-0.0547**
(0.0221)
-0.0540**
(0.0226)
-0.0443*
(0.0245)
-0.0387*
(0.0234)
-0.0398* 
(0.0228) 
-
0.0752***
(0.0203) 
-0.0729***
(0.0224) 
Log of population. (WDI) 0.0275** (0.0136) 
0.0276** 
(0.0135) 
0.0341*
(0.0184)
0.0296*
(0.0168)
0.0415***
(0.0140)
0.0482***
(0.0133)
0.0508***
(0.0134)
0.0508***
(0.0134) 
0.0276** 
(0.0111) 
0.0278** 
(0.0113) 
Countries with civil war 
experience before 1990. 
(CTD) 
0.141*** 
(0.0496) 
0.140*** 
(0.0495) 
0.144**
(0.0569)
0.144***
(0.0506)
0.132***
(0.0481)
0.128***
(0.0463)
0.130***
(0.0468)
0.129*** 
(0.0466) 
0.122** 
(0.0475) 
0.122** 
(0.0475) 
Ethnic fractionalization. 
(Alesina et al.) 
0.00577 
(0.0963) 
0.00201 
(0.0959) 
-0.0690
(0.121)
0.0121 
(0.0992)
0.0234
(0.0943)
0.0479 
(0.0947)
0.0549
(0.0946)
0.0515 
(0.0938) 
-0.0263 
(0.0901) 
0.0218 
(0.0926) 
Log of Inflow of people 
of refugee situation into 
the country. 1yr_lag. 
(UNHCR) 
0.00883***
(0.00331) - - 
0.00887***
(0.00339) - - - - - - 
Table 8. Panel IV Regression Results, Random Effects (Regional Dimension) 
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Log of refugee population 
by country or territory of 
asylum. 1yr_lag. (WDI) 
- 0.00856**(0.00335) - - - - - - - - 
Log of the number of 
Refugees (x1000) hosted. 
1yr_lag. (CSP) 
- - 0.0189***(0.00630) - - - - - - - 
Number of neighboring 
states sharing a border 
with the identified state. 
(CSP) 
- - - 0.00542(0.00982) - - - - - - 
Sum of all societal (civil 
and ethnic) MEPV 
magnitude scores for all 
neighboring states. 1yr 
lag. (CSP) 
- - - - 0.00405*(0.00231) - - - - - 
Sum of all societal (civil 
or ethnic) MEPV 
magnitude Scores for all 
regional states. (CSP) 
- - - - - 0.00355***(0.00134) - - - - 
Number of regional states 
with societal (civil or 
ethnic) war. (CSP) 
- - - - - - 0.0162***(0.00395) - - - 
Number of regional states 
with any type (civil or 
interstate) MEPV (CSP) 
- - - - - - - 0.0168***(0.00380) - - 
Log of regional arms 
imported. (Sub regional). 
1yr-lag. (SIPRI) 
- - - - - - - - 0.0134** (0.00536) - 
Africa dummy. (WDI) - - - - - - - - - -0.0755 (0.0978) 
Americas dummy. (WDI) - - - - - - - - - -0.0679(0.0912)
Asia dummy. (WDI) - - - - - - - - - 0.0398 (0.0918) 
Europe dummy. (WDI) - - - - - - - - - -0.0197 (0.0900) 
Constant 0.0484 (0.269) 
0.0585 
(0.267) 
0.127 
(0.349)
-0.0202
(0.284)
-0.139
(0.258)
-0.369 
(0.294)
-0.479*
(0.285)
-0.472* 
(0.280) 
0.232 
(0.226) 
0.293 
(0.230) 
Observations 2,755 2,760 1,845 2,686 3,082 3,082 3,092 3,092 3,207 3,439 
Number of cn 160 162 127 154 157 157 157 157 172 174 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
The refugee models (1-3) are similar differing only by the sources of data. The signs are all 
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positive and significant at .01 level indicating the possible existence of causal linkages between 
the numbers of hosted forcibly displaced persons and internal conflict. The data also appear to 
be consistent across different sources.  
The ‘number of neighboring states sharing a border with the identified state’ variable is not 
statistically significant suggesting that the mere number of shared borders do not necessarily 
increases the possibility of civil conflict. On the other hand, ‘the sum of all societal (civil and 
ethnic) MEPV magnitude scores’ for neighboring states (model (5)) and regional states (model 
(6)) and ‘the number of regional states with societal (civil or ethnic) war (model (7)) are 
statistically significant suggesting ‘conflict spill-over’ effect. This result was also found with 
model (8) where interstate warfare scores were included, meaning not only civil wars, but also 
interstate wars may likely diffuse across borders as a form of civil unrest. However, this does 
not indicate the direct linkage between the interstate wars and civil wars. On a similar vein, the 
log of regional arms imported is significant at .05 level. 
The regional dummies did not show any statistical significance from this result. After 
controlling for the key baseline variables, there appears to be no region which is more prone to 
civil wars than others although civil wars tend to disproportionately favor Africa and Asia over 
other regions. 
 
International Dimension 
The key determinants of international dimensions are international aid and peacekeeping. As 
discussed in the literature review section, the civil war studies are typically skeptical about the 
direct impact of international aid on deterring civil wars. Some literatures even go further and 
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argue that the international aid may even foster conflicts (Nunn & Qian, 2012). Furthermore, 
the theories like ‘greed theory’ introduces international aid as a possible lootable source for the 
anti-government rebels. The plausible counter-argument is the growth effect suggested by 
Collier and Hoeffler (2002a, 2002b), however, the discussion of aid and the economic 
development is outside the boundaries of this study. 
Still, in an attempt to test the possible relationship between the international aid and civil war 
onset, empirical models that follow the baseline model from Arcand and Chauvet (2001) were 
used. For controlling variables, primary commodity, ethnic fractionalization, civil war 
experience, democracy, and the log of GDP per capita were selected. In addition, 2-year and 
5-year lags of the total receipt of aid (the sum of official development aid + other official flows 
+ private loans), disbursement of aid (an actual payment), and ‘Net ODA received per capita’ 
at current dollars with 2-year lag were put into different models (1-5) to see their effects. The 
results are in Table 8.    
Similar to the results from previous studies, none of the tested models (1-5) show negative sign 
on aid variable and only 5-year lag of ‘log of aid disbursement’ is statistically significant at .05 
level. This may be due to a ‘greed’ logic, or endogeneity issue where unaccounted error terms 
affect both the onset of civil war and the receipt of aid. In short, this study couldn’t find a strong 
supporting evidence on the international aid’s intrastate conflict-preventing role. More study 
on this topic will be needed to fully comprehend the true effect of the international aid on 
intrastate conflicts. 
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VARIABLES (1) Onset 
(2) 
Onset 
(3) 
Onset 
(4) 
Onset 
(5) 
Onset 
Log of GDP per capita. 1 year-lagged. (PWT) -0.0212 (0.0402) 
0.0103 
(0.0437) 
-0.0262 
(0.0395) 
0.0252 
(0.0436) 
-0.0179 
(0.0387) 
Log of population. (WDI) 0.0513*** (0.0170) 
0.0605*** 
(0.0173) 
0.0439** 
(0.0173) 
0.0552*** 
(0.0173) 
0.0512*** 
(0.0169) 
Countries with civil war experience before 1990. 
(CTD) 
0.114** 
(0.0548) 
0.109** 
(0.0546) 
0.109* 
(0.0561) 
0.103* 
(0.0553) 
0.110** 
(0.0557) 
Log of aid total receipts. 2yr lag. (OECD) -0.000881 (0.00770) - - - - 
Ethnic fractionalization. (Alesina et al.) 0.00838 (0.116) 
0.0120 
(0.115) 
-0.00914 
(0.117) 
0.0100 
(0.116) 
0.00593 
(0.116) 
Agriculture, value added (% of GDP) (WDI) 0.00461*** (0.00177) 
0.00728*** 
(0.00219) 
0.00419** 
(0.00180) 
0.00809*** 
(0.00219) 
0.00481*** 
(0.00178) 
Institutionalized Democracy  (CSP) -0.00161***(0.000459) 
-0.00229***
(0.000481) 
-0.00137***
(0.000433) 
-0.00209*** 
(0.000461) 
-0.00141***
(0.000431) 
Log of aid total receipts. 5yr lag. (OECD) - 0.00398 (0.00722) - - - 
Log of aid disbursement. 2yr_lag. (OECD) - - 0.00857 (0.00823) - - 
Log of aid disbursement. 5yr_lag. (OECD) - - - 0.0153* (0.00848) - 
Net ODA received per capita (current US$). 2-yr lag. 
(WDI) - - - - 
8.79e-06 
(0.000189) 
Constant -0.624 (0.455) 
-1.107** 
(0.494) 
-0.496 
(0.430) 
-1.198** 
(0.482) 
-0.656 
(0.428) 
Observations 1,851 1,557 1,949 1,648 2,016 
Number of cn 119 118 119 119 119 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Lastly, contrary to other indicators of civil war in this study, testing the effect of the 
peacekeeping operations requires a different approach. The previous modeling method, the 
panel regression may not be the optimal approach because peacekeeping operations are 
ipso facto reversely correlated with crises (or highly endogenous), i.e. peacekeeping 
operations present only if when there is violent crisis situation; this effect cannot be 
sufficiently controlled with the previous modeling methods and the data. This constitutes a 
Table 9. Panel IV Regression Results, Random Effects (International Aid) 
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reason why the literatures that empirically tested this topic using a panel-data method is 
scarce. Instead, the survival model is more commonly used, but as discussed, this model 
does not fully take into account the time-varying characteristic of independent variables, 
limiting the estimation results. Therefore, a linear dynamic panel model, which uses 
Generalized Method of Moments may be a better substitute. 
To this end, the previous model was re-modelled as the following general form:  
 (3) 
As it can be seen from the formula (3), in this model, the dependent variable, ‘civil war 
onset’ at time t is now temporally correlated with ‘civil war onset’ at time t-1; and αi 
specifies an unobserved, time-invariant country specific effects. This assumption is 
reasonable because civil wars tend to span over years. Once this type of autocorrelation is 
specified, and the unobserved heterogeneity (αi ) is removed using first difference,  
 (4) 
The standard ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation is biased because ∆cit-1 is correlated 
with ∆εit. However, because ∆εit is not correlated with ∆cit-2 this can be used as an 
instrument to ∆cit-1. Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond estimation technique uses more lags as 
instruments and known to provide an efficient estimate of the above model.12 
Another characteristic that is particularly useful for this technique is an additional input of 
lagged independent variables as instruments. Since peacekeeping operations display strong 
                                                 
12See Arellano and Bover, 1995; Blundell and Bond, 1998; Cameron& Trivedi, 2009 and Greene, 7th. Chapter 
13 for more discussion on the technical aspect. 
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temporal dependence, this treatment may be useful in this type of empirical testing for more 
consistent estimation. 
In the model, military expenditure, military expenditure squared, log of population, log of 
GDP per capita, ethnic and religious fractionalization, forest area, and previous civil war 
experienced were used as controls. The military expenditure was coded as predetermined 
in the STATA command and its one-year log was included as an additional regressor. The 
GDP per capita was coded endogenous with contemporaneous effect considering the 
negative shock from the conflict episode. As it was written in the model, the one and two-
year logs of conflict episode binary variables were included as regressors and the years, t-
3 to t-5 were used as instruments in the regression analysis. Similarly, one year lag of 
peacekeeping variable was included in the model and coded endogenous and the lagged 
years of t-3 to t-5 were used as instruments. The overall model was estimated using one-
step GMM with ‘vce(robust)’ option specified.  
The overall statistics are reported in the table 10. The statistical results provide some 
evidence to the effectiveness of peacekeeping operations with negative sign and a 
significance at 0.1 level (models (1-2) and (4-5)). Other coefficients are similar to the 
previous empirical tests in this study, with an exception of ethnic fractionalization, which 
was consistently insignificant throughout the tests. Yet, unlike Fortna (2004, 2008), this 
study is careful to assert that peacekeeping operations strongly work.         
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VARIABLES (1) Onset 
(2) 
Onset 
(3) 
Onset 
(4) 
Onset 
(5) 
Onset 
L.Episode Year (CTD) 0.360*** (0.0526) 
0.350*** 
(0.0515) 
0.349*** 
(0.0514) 
0.354*** 
(0.0526) 
0.349*** 
(0.0527) 
L2. Episode Year (CTD) 0.106* (0.0558) 
0.0974* 
(0.0542) 
0.0964* 
(0.0547) 
0.0983* 
(0.0542) 
0.0906* 
(0.0540) 
Military expenditure to GDP ratio. (SIPRI) 0.0170 (0.0134) 
0.0175 
(0.0133) 
0.0181 
(0.0139) 
0.0198 
(0.0140) 
0.0168 
(0.0144) 
L. Military expenditure to GDP ratio. (SIPRI) 0.0115*** (0.00409) 
0.0105** 
(0.00410) 
0.00984** 
(0.00409) 
0.0113*** 
(0.00352) 
0.00975*** 
(0.00369) 
Military expenditure to GDP ratio squared. (SIPRI) -0.000619**(0.000311) 
-0.000703**
(0.000322) 
-0.000727**
(0.000341) 
-0.000771** 
(0.000340) 
-0.000711**
(0.000340) 
Peacekeeping operations. 1 yr lag. (UN) -0.102* (0.0556) 
-0.100* 
(0.0561) 
-0.0799 
(0.0610) 
-0.100* 
(0.0570) 
-0.101* 
(0.0565) 
Log of population. (WDI) 0.103*** (0.0282) 
0.0952*** 
(0.0266) 
0.1000*** 
(0.0264) 
0.0959*** 
(0.0270) 
0.0702** 
(0.0344) 
Log of GDP per capita. (PWT) -0.0246 (0.0156) 
-0.0102 
(0.0154) 
-0.0114 
(0.0158) 
-0.00831 
(0.0164) 
-0.00163 
(0.0158) 
Ethnic fractionalization. (Alesina et al.) - 0.484*** (0.180) 
0.540*** 
(0.185) 
0.485*** 
(0.171) 
0.467*** 
(0.163) 
Religion fractionalization. (Alesina et al.) - - -0.201 (0.181) - - 
Forest area (% of land area) (WDI) - - - 0.00134 (0.00243) 
0.00175 
(0.00237) 
Countries with civil war experience before 1990. 
(CTD) - - - - 
0.145 
(0.102) 
Constant -1.418*** (0.479) 
-1.623*** 
(0.505) 
-1.628*** 
(0.506) 
-1.698*** 
(0.510) 
-1.402** 
(0.580) 
Observations 2,611 2,590 2,577 2,568 2,568 
Number of cn 158 156 155 156 156 
Robust standard errors in parentheses  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1           
 
 
Table 10. Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond Dynamic Panel Estimation Results, (PKO)
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V. CONCLUSION 
The models of civil war literatures on conflict onset can be broadly categorized into five 
dimensions: government, individual, geo-political, regional, and international. Those 
dimensions are not mutually exclusive about their arguments, but they are based on distinctive 
lines of thoughts. Their major emphases are: for government dimension, on government’s 
capacity to repress and contain dissents; for individual dimension, on private incentives such 
as lootable primary commodities and opportunity costs proxied by education and income; for 
geo-political dimension, on exogenous geographical and political variables—terrain, natural 
resource sites, and history of conflict; for regional dimension, on regional spill-over effects 
through population movement (refugees) and neighboring conflicts; finally, for international 
dimension, on the effect of international aid and peacekeeping operations on the prevention of 
civil war onset.  
This study attempted to empirically test the models proposed by each dimension using the panel 
IV estimation technique on binary dependent variable using a comprehensive dataset that 
includes 211 countries and years 1990-2010. For testing peacekeeping operations, dynamic 
panel data estimation method was used. By appending dozens of publicly available data, the 
dataset could compile more than 400 macroeconomic and political variables. This allowed 
more options of selecting variables with relatively small number of missing observations.  
The empirical test results largely conformed to existing literatures. On government dimension, 
the indicators on government repression and military strength were statistically significant. 
Military expenditure to GDP ratio had a positive sign, but its squared was negative, suggesting 
inverse U-curve relationship between the armed conflict and government’s investment in the 
repressive apparatus; on individual dimension, opportunity cost-related variables: education, 
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labor participation, and mortality rates were significant; on geo-political dimension, some 
evidences were found on the natural resources, cumulative battle deaths and the history of 
conflict, and religious heterogeneity variables—on the contrary, not enough evidence was 
found on diamonds and colonial history; on regional dimension, the magnitude scores of 
neighboring armed conflicts, inflow of refugees, and the regional arms import were significant 
while the regional dummies were not—suggesting that the countries in Africa and Asia are not 
conflict prone just because of their regional identities; on international dimension of aid and 
peacekeeping, only limited evidence for the effect of international aid and some supporting 
evidence for peacekeeping were found. Since peacekeeping operations are parts of 
consequences of civil conflicts, the reverse causality (endogeneity) issue is strong. Due to this 
problem, a survival analysis method, which often overlook temporal correlation of independent 
variable are typically used. Instead, a dynamic panel estimation techniques such as Arellano-
Bover/Blundell-Bond dynamic panel method may provide a better estimate by treating lags of 
independent and dependent variables as instruments. Its result was supportive of the role of 
peacekeeping operations in deterring the onset of violence. 
Overall, this study finds that there are some evidences that can back up the claims of each 
dimension. This implies that the onset of civil war is a complex phenomenon that is not likely 
to be caused by a single element. It also tells us that civil wars are likely to erupt under specific 
conditions and that the incidences are not purely accidental. With some mix of politico-
economic conditions and regional influences, civil wars are more likely in certain countries 
than others. Additionally, while country-specific idiosyncrasies such as the number of 
petroleum sites and religious heterogeneity affect the onset of civil war, more general politico-
economic characteristics seem to be more consistently related to its onset. This suggests that 
the civil wars are preventable through politico-economic changes. However, the international 
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efforts, such as international development aid and peacekeeping operations are successful in 
the prevention of civil war only to the limited extent. This is due to the rigidity of fundamental 
politico-economic capacities of a country. While these measures may prove to be effective in 
stopping immediate atrocities and humanitarian crises, without altering the underlying politics 
and economic development situations, the prevention of internal conflicts are more susceptible 
to failure. Therefore, I suggest, the international efforts should be a two-tracked approach: one 
with immediate intervention to halt conflicts and regional spill-over; and the other with a more 
targeted approach to economic and social development.    
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